The Impact of Institutions and Development on Happiness by Duha T. Altindag & Junyue Xu





        DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
    The Impact of Institutions and Development on Happiness 
 
 
Duha T. Altindag  
Louisiana State University 
 
Junyue Xu  
Louisiana State University 
 
 






Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6306 
http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/ 
  
The Impact of Institutions and Development on Happiness 
 
Duha T. Altindag                             Junyue Xu                                 







This paper demonstrates that institutional factors influence the subjective well-being of 
individuals differently in rich versus poor countries. A lower level of corruption, a more 
democratic government and better civil rights increase the well-being of individuals in rich 
countries, whereas an increase in per capita income has no impact. On the contrary, in poor 
countries the extent of corruption, democracy and civil rights have no influence on happiness, 
but an increase in per capita income impacts happiness positively. This stark contrast may be due 
to the difference of preferences over income and institutional factors. 
 





In the past decade, economists have been increasingly involved in the analysis of the 
determinants of individuals' subjective well-being which is usually referred to as “happiness.” If 
one accepts the notion that the ultimate goal of an individual is the pursuit of happiness, then 
economists’ sudden invasion of a field which has been usually regarded as psychologists' 
territory is by no means surprising. In fact, the study of happiness can not only shed light on the 
utility theory
1, but it may also provide information that can help guide public policy
2. 
Most research in the happiness literature finds that age, employment, marital status and 
gender are highly correlated with an individual’s level of happiness. Macroeconomic variables 
such as the unemployment rate and the inflation rate also influence happiness (Di Tella, 
MacCulloch and Oswald 2001, 2003; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005; Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2004; Luttmer 2005; Mary Daly et al. 2009; Blanchflower and Oswald 2007). 
However, studies that investigate the impact of national income on happiness report conflicting 
findings. When cross-sectional data sets are used, a positive correlation is detected between GDP 
and measures of happiness, but the analysis within a country over time reveals that an increase in 
the level of GDP does not influence (or influences only slightly) the happiness levels of the 
residents in that country. This is especially true in wealthier countries. This stylized fact is 
known as the Easterlin Paradox. (Easterlin1974, 1995, 2001b; Oswald 1997). 
A variety of explanations have been proposed for the Easterlin Paradox. For example, the 
relative income hypothesis states that an individual’s happiness depends on his/her relative 
income rather than the absolute level of income (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Clark et al. 2007, 
Easterlin 1994). This may help explain why an increase in incomes of all individuals does not 
result in an increase in the average happiness level
3. Another explanation by Easterlin (2001) 2 
 
stresses the role of individuals’ aspirations and expectations in determination of happiness levels. 
He suggests that individuals’ aspirations and expectations (regarding the goods and services) rise 
with income level. Therefore, even though the individual’s income level rises over time which 
helps her satisfy her previous aspirations, she wants to consume more to be as happy as she 
thought she would be when her previous expectations were satisfied. This explanation is 
supported by the evidence provided by Di Tella, Haisken-DeNew and MacCulloch (2007) and Di 
Tella and McCulloch (2008) who report “that once ‘basic needs’ are satisfied, there is happiness 
adaptation to further gains in income.” 
In this paper, we find evidence supporting the idea that once a certain income threshold is 
reached, individuals’ preferences shift to more non-materialistic goods and services. This shift of 
preferences idea is originated in the psychology literature. For example, Maslow (1943) 
suggested that individuals have to satisfy their physiological and safety needs first in order to 
derive utility from satisfying higher order needs such as love, belonging, esteem and 
actualization. In this hierarchy of needs scheme, lower level needs, such as physiological and 
safety needs, can generally be satisfied with materialistic goods and satiating these needs require 
a certain level of income. For example, a given level of income or wealth is necessary to rent/buy 
a house or to eat food. Once these lower-ordered needs are satisfied the individual seeks to 
pursue higher-order needs which are generally non-materialistic such as love, belonging and self 
actualization. 
Borrowing the idea of shift in preferences from psychology literature, we propose that 
non-materialistic goods contribute to the happiness of individuals in rich countries but the 
materialistic goods don’t. Similarly, materialistic goods should have an influence on happiness of 
poor countries’ residents while non-materialistic goods should not. In the context of non-3 
 
materialistic goods (and higher order needs), we analyze the institutional characteristics of a 
country such as the extent of democracy and civil rights and lack of corruption. The democracy 
and civil rights indices we employ measure the extent to which citizens of a country are involved 
in decision making and the degree of personal liberties in the country, respectively. Corruption 
index is determined by the degree of misuse of entrusted power for private gain in a country.  
Rich and poor countries have dissimilarities in these institutional characteristics and the 
preferences of individuals over these characteristics in rich and poor countries may be different. 
For example, people in rich countries may value institutional characteristics (such as the 
prevalence and protection of civil rights) of the country more than they value the level of 
development or GDP, and for individuals in poor countries the opposite may be true. In that case, 
an increase in a rich country’s GDP may not affect the happiness of its citizens, but a poor 
country’s residents would be happier when that country’s GDP increases. 
The hypothesis of different preferences of individuals in rich versus poor countries is also 
consistent with the findings in both political science and economics literature. For example, it is 
well known that people in both the ancient Athens and the industrial era England in 18
th century 
experienced rapid economic development along with democratization and an increase in the 
magnitude of civil rights (Midlarsky 1992). Furthermore, Schemeil (2000) suggests that in 
ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, which were amongst the most developed regions of their time, 
politics relied on public debate and detailed voting procedures in public assemblies; the justice 
system allowed appeal rights and opposing parties could question the leaders’ policies. 
Acemoglu et.al (2008), Barro (1999) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) report a positive 
correlation between high economic development and more democratic governments. Treisman 
(2000) and Mocan (2008) suggest that individuals in developing countries suffer from corruption 4 
 
more than their counterparts in the developed countries do. All of this evidence indicates that 
some institutional characteristics are common to more developed countries but not to their poor 
counterparts. This difference may be observed due to individuals’ changing preferences over 
institutions and governance as the countries develop economically and get wealthier. 
This is the first paper to analyze the impact of both GDP and institutional factor on 
happiness. The only study that is similar to ours in design is Veenhoven (2000) who finds that 
political freedom contributes to happiness, particularly in rich countries. However, his study 
analyzed happiness level across countries using a cross-section of 30 countries. Frey and Stutzer 
(2000a, 2000b) report that the degree of direct democracy influences individual well-being 
positively based on data only from Switzerland, one of the richest countries in the world. 
Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer (2008), in their study of country level happiness differentials 
between public and private sector employees in 42 European and Latin American countries, 
suggest that corruption generates a happiness premium for bureaucrats through the acquisition of 
rents, but they do not report the impact of corruption on well-being of overall population. 
Our empirical strategy involves using repeated cross-sections of individuals from around 
the world to analyze the impacts of democracy, civil rights and corruption on individual 
subjective well being in different samples differentiated by the income level of the country. That 
is, one of our samples is composed of individuals who live in rich countries and the other sample 
consists of individuals who live in poor countries. To investigate the possibility that preferences 
over GDP versus institutional characteristics differ between residents of rich and poor countries, 
(besides the commonly used control variables in the happiness research) we include measures of 
both GDP and institutional characteristics and compare their impacts on the happiness levels of 
the individuals in these countries.  5 
 
We contribute to the happiness literature by demonstrating that institutional factors such 
as a more democratic regime, more civil rights and less corruption in a country are positively 
related to the subjective well-being of individuals and that the impacts of these characteristics are 
different for residents of rich and poor countries. Our second contribution is that we provide an 
alternative explanation to the Easterlin Paradox. Specifically, our results suggest that the 
existence (lack of existence) of a positive relationship between happiness and desirable 
institutional attributes (per capita GDP) in developed countries may be an indication for stronger 
preferences for institutional quality in developed countries. On the other hand, the fact that per 
capita GDP impacts happiness positively while desirable institutional characteristics do not have 
an influence on happiness in poor countries may indicate stronger preferences for income over 
institutional quality in these countries. We also show for the residents of rich countries that GDP 
growth in last 20, 25 or 30 years do not contribute to the happiness of the individuals, holding 
constant the institutional variables and per capita income 20, 25 and 30 years ago. This regularity 
may be evidence for the existence of a threshold living standard (high enough to satisfy the basic 
needs) over which individuals’ preferences shift towards satisfying higher order needs such as 
pursuit of a more democratic environment with greater level of civil rights and less corruption. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. 




  The data set is obtained from the four waves of World Values Survey
4 conducted on 
random sample of individuals living in 80 different countries between years 1981 and 2004. The 6 
 
sample on which the empirical analysis is conducted includes more than 200,000 individuals and 
it is determined mainly by the availability of aggregate-level variables
5. Some of the countries 
have held the surveys for more than once. The measure of individuals’ subjective well-being is 
based on the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?” Possible answers range from “Most dissatisfied” (represented by  1) and “Most 
satisfied” (represented by 10). This happiness measure is similar to those used by previous 
research (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2008, Oswald 1997). 
  Individual characteristics as well as country-level variables are employed as explanatory 
variables. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, income, education level, 
employment and marital status and the number of children
5. The source of all the individual-
level variables is the World Values Survey. The country-level control variables used are GDP, 
inflation and unemployment rates, carbon dioxide emission per capita and the birth rate of the 
country. These controls are used to capture various aspects of the country, such as development 
level, pollution, and health condition of the overall population. They are obtained from various 
sources, such as World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Penn World Tables and 
International Labour Organization’s KILM Database. Detailed definitions, descriptions and 
sources of the variables are given in Table 1. 
  The key explanatory variables are corruption, the extent of civil rights and degree of 
democracy exercised in the countries. The corruption level in the country is measured by the 
corruption perceptions index that is provided by the Transparency International. The corruption 
perceptions index (TI) measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians. Ratings range from “10” (least corrupt) to “0” (most corrupt).  
The survey measures public sector corruption or the abuse of public office for private gain. It 7 
 
only focuses on corruption of local and national governments. The TI is a composite index 
compiled from surveys originating from different independent institutions. The surveys measure 
the perceptions of local residents, expatriates, business people, academics and risk analysts. Each 
survey is standardized so that its scaling system matches the TI’s index of 0-10. Survey results 
are combined in three-year periods to reduce abrupt variations that could potentially be caused 
by errors. For some of the countries in our study, corruption information was not available from 
the source. In order not to lose observations, for each country, we constructed our corruption 
measure by taking the average of the country’s corruption score from the available information. 
This does not constitute a problem, since it has been documented that corruption level in a 
country do not vary much over time (Mauro 1995 and Mocan 2008). 
  The Civil Liberties index (CLI) measures freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
and religion.  The Freedom House rates civil liberties on a scale of 1 to 7, one representing the 
most free and seven representing the least free. We recoded this index such that “1” is the score 
for the least degree of civil rights and “7” is for the highest degree. Countries with a rating of 7 
generally have an established and equitable rule of law with free economic activity, and their 
citizens enjoy a full range of civil liberties.  A rating of 6 indicates some deficiencies, but these 
countries are still relatively free. A rating of 3, 4, or 5 may indicate partial compliance with all of 
the elements of civil liberties; it may also indicate complete freedom in some areas coupled with 
complete denial in others. Countries with these ratings experience varying degrees of censorship, 
political terror, and prevention of free association. Countries with a rating of 2 enjoy partial 
rights and a few social and religious freedoms with some restricted business activity.  In general, 
however, these citizens experience severely restricted expression and association coupled with 
political terror (e.g. political prisoners).  A rating of 1 indicates virtually no freedom. The source 8 
 
distinguishes between constitutional guarantees of rights and those in practice.  Therefore, the 
CLI does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world 
rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Thus, the survey ratings generally reflect the 
interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental. For the very small 
amount of missing information from the source for some of the countries in our data set, we used 
the value in the index that is closest in time to the missing information for a country. For 
example, if the information is missing in 1985 for a country but available for 1983, we used the 
value of 1983 for 1985. 
  From Polity IV, we obtained Democracy variable, which ranges between -10 and 10. 
While a “-10” indicates the regime is an autocracy, a “10” means a democratic government is in 
the office. When assigning values to the regimes of the countries, Polity IV considers three 
essential elements: degree of competition in political participation, institutionalization of 
constraints on executive power and availability of civil liberties to citizens in their daily lives and 
political participation. A fully democratic government grants civil liberties to all citizens in their 
daily lives and in political participation, allows fully competitive political participation and 
opposition. On the other hand, a fully autocratic system sharply restricts or suppresses 
competitive political participation.  The chief executives are chosen by an elite group and 
exercise power with few institutionalized constraints.  
Finally, the purposes of our study, we divided our sample into two parts: the rich and the 
poor countries. We employ the definition of World Bank which uses $11,500 GDP per capita 
level as the threshold to separate the rich countries from the poor ones. Ireland and Argentina 
belong to different categories in different years according to World Bank’s definition. Otherwise, 
all of the countries belong to either rich or poor group throughout all the survey years. 9 
 
 
III. Empirical Framework 
Following the literature (Di Tella, McCulloch and Oswald 2003, Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2004, Blanchflower and Oswald 2007), happiness is determined by the equation 
presented below: 
(1)               , ,          , ,  ,  ,  ,    ,  ,  ,   
We created the outcome variable, Satisfaction, from the answers of the individuals to the 
question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” The 
answer is chosen from a scale between one and ten, with “Most dissatisfied” and “Most 
satisfied” are represented by “1” and “10”, respectively. It is obvious that Satisfaction is an 
ordinal variable and it reflects the subjective well-being of individuals. Therefore, we can 
assume that people rate their well-being according to a continuous latent variable which can be 
viewed as a value of happiness. The greater this latent variable is for an individual given his or 
her personal characteristics and environmental factors, the higher satisfaction level he or she will 
report. Thus, it is relatively straightforward to use an ordered probit model to identify the 
determinants of subjective well-being. In addition, we provide OLS estimates in the Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2.
6 
 In  Equation  (1),               , ,  is the level of subjective well-being reported by the 
individual i , in country c in year t.     ,  represents the per capita real income in country c in 
year t. Institutional variables, such as corruption, civil rights and democracy make up the 
vector   , . The vectors   , ,  and   ,  include individual-level characteristics and country-level 
controls
7, respectively. We estimate equation (1) using the samples of individuals from rich and 
poor countries. We hypothize that variables in vector   ,  (corruption, democracy and civil 10 
 
rights) and     ,  impact happiness of individuals in rich countries differently than they affect 
happiness of those in poor countries. 
  Following Di Tella and McCulloch (2008), we also estimate the equation (2) below: 
(2)               , ,          , ,  ,  ,  ,    ,    ,       ,   ,   ,   
  In equation (2),        ,    denotes the growth rate of the GDP per capita between 
years t-k and t in country c. We use 20, 25 and 30 for k. Using these large lags in equation (2), 
we analyze whether economic growth over the last k years improves well-being, holding constant 
the institutional factors and GDP per capita k  years ago. The countries which used to be 
categorized as rich k  years ago are still in the “rich” sample. Similarly, categorization of the 
“poor” countries has not changed over time, either. Therefore, with this specification, we will be 
able to analyze differences in preferences over (a proxy for) living standards k years ago, growth 
in living standards and institutional characteristics of the countries between the individuals in 
rich and poor countries. 
 
IV. Results 
Impact on Happiness of Institutional Factors versus Current GDP per capita 
We estimate equation (1) using ordered probit over the whole sample and also over the 
rich and poor countries’ residents separately to investigate the potentially-different effects on 
happiness of the institutional factors and GDP per capita between these groups. The estimates are 
presented in Table 2. In the first three columns, equation (1) is estimated including only 
individual characteristics and country and year fixed effects. Columns 4 to 6 report the estimates 
of equation (1) excluding only the vector   , , the institutional characteristics of the country. 
Finally in the last three columns of Table 2, equation (1) is estimated with the whole set of 11 
 
explanatory variables. All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at 
country-year level. That is, we assume that the unobservables are correlated between residents of 
a country and that these correlations may change from year to year.  
The results in Table 2 indicate that the coefficients of the individual level characteristics 
are similar in both magnitude and significance in all three variants of equation (1): fixed effects, 
country characteristics excluding institutional factors and the whole set of controls. The 
estimates of gender, age, personal income, education, personal employment and marital status 
are significant determinants of happiness in all specifications. That is, females, the wealthy, the 
well-educated and the employed are happier than males, the poor, the poorly-educated and the 
unemployed. Furthermore, individuals’ happiness is U-shaped in age.  This finding is in line with 
the previous happiness research.  
  From columns 4 to 6 of Table 2, we can infer that the coefficient of GDP per capita is 
significant in both rich and poor countries when institutional characteristics are not accounted 
for. However, including democracy, civil rights and corruption into the specification reduces the 
significance of GDP per capita in rich countries. These estimates are reported in columns 7-9 of 
Table 2. It is interesting to note that for residents of the rich countries GDP per capita does not 
have a significant influence on happiness but democracy, civil rights and corruption have a 
positive impact on happiness. The opposite is true for the residents of the poor countries. 
  In Table 3, we present the marginal effects for the country-level variables. Given the 
large number of categories of the dependent variable, we only provide the marginal effects for 
the highest and the lowest category. The two panels of Table 3 display the marginal effect 
estimates for two different specifications. The first panel is based on the model that includes all 
covariates but Democracy, corruption and civil rights. Thus, this panel corresponds to the results 12 
 
reported in columns 4-6 of Table 2. The second panel of Table 3 reports the marginal effect 
estimates for the model that includes all covariates. 
  As demonstrated in Panel 1 of Table 3, when democracy, civil rights and corruption in 
the country are not controlled for, GDP per capita has a positive impact on the probability of 
being most satisfied and a negative impact on the probability of being most dissatisfied in both 
rich and poor countries. However, when democracy, civil rights and corruption are included in 
the specification (presented in Panel 2 of Table 3), the impact of GDP per capita disappears in 
rich countries sample. The marginal effects in the second panel indicate that a lower level of 
corruption, better civil rights and a more democratic government increase the probability of 
being in the most satisfied category by 1.79%, 4.90% and 4.66%, respectively. These attributes 
of the institutions in a rich country decrease the probability of being in the most dissatisfied 
category by 0.20%, 0.58% and 0.55%, respectively. On the other hand, the probability of being 
in the highest or in the lowest categories of happiness for the individuals in poor countries are 
affected by GDP per capita, but not by the institutional factors. An increase of $1,000 in GDP 
per capita in a poor country increases the probability that the individual is in the most satisfied 
category by 1.05% and it reduces the probability of being in the most dissatisfied category by 
0.64%. 
  The analysis in this section suggests that when institutional factors are accounted for, 
GDP per capita does not influence the individuals’ well-being in rich countries, but instead better 
civil rights, less corruption and a more democratic government impact the happiness of people in 
rich countries. The opposite is true for the individuals living in poor countries. 
 
Impact on Happiness of Institutional Factors versus Growth in GDP per capita 13 
 
  Di Tella and Mac Culloch (2008) estimate a model which attempts to explain average 
happiness level in rich and poor countries as a function of GDP per capita 45 years ago and with 
the growth rate of GDP per capita during the last 45 years. They find that the average level of 
happiness in a poor country is determined by both past GDP per capita and GDP growth, but 
only the level of past GDP per capita in a rich country impacts average happiness. They conclude 
that per capita GDP growth over some threshold level of GDP per capita (such as a level enough 
to satisfy basic needs) do not contribute to the happiness. 
  We estimate a similar model by running the regression specified by equation (2) using 
ordered probit. Instead of considering a 45-year period, we use shorter lags (20,25 and 30 years), 
because employing a 45-year lag reduces the sample size sharply due to absence of GDP data 45 
years ago for many countries in the sample. Table 4 provides the coefficients of the variables of 
interest. Columns 1-3, 4-6 and 7-9 of Table 4 corresponds to 30, 25 and 20-year lags 
respectively. Table 5 presents the marginal effects for the highest and lowest categories.  
  Regardless of the length of the lag used, the coefficients of democracy, civil rights and 
corruption are significant in rich countries sample. However both past levels of GDP per capita 
and the growth in GDP per capita do not impact happiness in rich countries. On the other hand, 
the opposite is true in the sample of poor countries. Table 5 shows that a $1,000 increase in GDP 
per capita of 30 years ago decreases the probability of being in the most dissatisfied category by 
1.37% and increases the probability of being in the most satisfied category by 3.42% in poor 
countries. However, a $1,000 rise in the GDP per capita of 30 years ago does not significantly 
affect the probability of being in the highest or the lowest category of happiness in rich countries. 
Moreover, experiencing one percentage point extra GDP growth in the last 30 years reduces the 
probability of being in the most dissatisfied category by 1.46% and increases the probability of 14 
 
being in the highest category by 3.64% for the individuals in the poor countries. The same 
change in the growth rate does not affect the happiness of rich countries’ residents significantly. 
As reported in columns 4-9 of Table 5, we find similar results for 25 and 20 year lags. 
  The findings in this section indicate that neither the level of past GDP per capita nor the 
growth rate in GDP per capita significantly impact the well being of individuals in rich countries, 
when institutional factors are controlled for. On the other hand, in poor countries higher levels of 
past GDP per capita and GDP growth are associated with more happiness. Since most of the rich 
countries today used to be rich 30 (or 25 or 20) years ago, we conclude that after reaching some 
level of living standards, experiencing rapid growth does not increase the happiness levels of the 
individuals. As explained by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008), funds beyond the amount needed 
to satisfy the basic needs do not seem to buy happiness. We suggest that after this threshold, 
individual’s preferences shift towards satisfying higher order needs, such as living in a more 
democratic country with a greater extent of civil rights and less corruption. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Using data on 200,000 individuals from 80 different countries, we find that (after 
controlling for commonly used determinants of happiness such as age, education, personal 
income, employment and marital status) institutional factors such as the extent of democracy, 
civil rights, and corruption have a systematic influence on reported well-being of individuals 
who live in rich countries. Per capita income has no effect. On the other hand, the happiness 
levels of the individuals living in poor countries are not affected by these institutional factors, 
but instead an increase in income per capita improves happiness. This may be evidence of a 
change in preferences over living standards (as proxied by GDP per capita) and improved 15 
 
institutional factors as a country develops economically. Our results are in line with Frey and 
Stutzer (2000a, 2000b), who report that direct democratic institutions in Switzerland (one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world) contribute positively to the happiness of the Swiss. 
We obtain the same results when we employ past GDP per capita and the GDP growth 
rate in the models instead of current GDP. In those countries that were already rich in the past, 
the happiness levels of the individuals do not improve as GDP per capita increases further over 
and above the past GDP per capita. In contrast, both economic development in the last decades 
and the level of past GDP per capita have a positive impact on the happiness of the poor 
countries’ residents. In other words, poor countries’ residents enjoy the benefit of economic 
development and report greater happiness levels but they do not get happier as institutions 
improve (such as a more democratic government, better civil rights or less corruption). The 
results suggest that after a certain standard of living is reached, additional economic development 
does not improve happiness, but instead individuals favor a more democratic system with more 
civil rights and less corruption. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) that 
set forth the adaptation hypothesis of happiness to income after a certain threshold. However, our 
results show that there is still room for improvement in happiness of rich country residents 
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controls include the inflation and unemployment rates, carbon dioxide emission per capita and 




Descriptive Statistics, Definitions and Sources
 
    Whole Sample  Poor Countries  Rich Countries 
Variable Descriptions  and  (Sources)  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Female  Dummy for females. (A)  0.517  0.500  0.510  0.500  0.527  0.499 
Gender Missing  Dummy for missing gender information  0.001  0.025  0.001  0.023  0.001  0.029 
Age  Individual’s age, scaled by 0.1. (A) 4.131  1.630  3.947 1.542 4.400 1.716 
Middle Income  Dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is in 
the middle income group in his country. (A) 
0.318 0.466 0.321 0.467 0.313 0.464 
Upper Income  Dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is in 
the upper income group in his country. (A) 
0.258 0.437 0.264 0.441 0.248 0.432 
Income Missing  Dummy for missing individual income information. 
(A) 
0.130 0.336 0.102 0.303 0.171 0.376 
Low-Educated  Dummy that takes value 1 if the individual has not 
completed schooling beyond primary school. (A) 
0.205 0.404 0.256 0.437 0.130 0.336 
Education 
Missing 
Dummy for missing education information. (A)  0.233  0.423  0.092  0.288  0.440  0.496 
Part-time worker  Dummy for part time working individual. (A)  0.073  0.259  0.065  0.246  0.084  0.277 
Self Employed  Dummy for a self-employed individual. (A)  0.084  0.277  0.104  0.305  0.054  0.227 
Retired  Dummy for a retired individual. (A)  0.140  0.347  0.114  0.317  0.178  0.382 
Housewife  Dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is 
dealing with home production. (A) 
0.135 0.341 0.143 0.350 0.122 0.328 
Student  Dummy for not working individual attending school. 
(A) 
0.068 0.252 0.074 0.261 0.060 0.237 
Unemployed  Dummy for an unemployed individual. (A)  0.080  0.271  0.098  0.297  0.053  0.224 
Other work  Dummy for other types of individual employment 
status. 
0.019 0.135 0.020 0.141 0.016 0.126 
Employment 
Missing 
Dummy for missing employment information. (A)  0.029  0.168  0.043  0.204  0.008  0.089 
Married  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
married. (A) 
0.586 0.492 0.588 0.492 0.584 0.493 
Cohabiting  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
cohabiting with a partner. (A) 
0.044 0.205 0.042 0.201 0.047 0.211 
Divorced  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
divorced. (A) 
0.037 0.189 0.029 0.168 0.049 0.216 22 
 
Table 1 Continued 
    Whole Sample  Poor Countries  Rich Countries 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Separated  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
separated. (A) 
0.015 0.123 0.015 0.122 0.016 0.124 
Widowed  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual’s 
spouse is deceased. (A) 
0.066 0.249 0.063 0.243 0.072 0.258 
Other Marita 
Status 
Dummy for other types of marital status. (A) 0.001  0.024  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.038 
Marital Status 
Missing 
Dummy for missing marital status information. (A)  0.017  0.128  0.026  0.159  0.004  0.060 
1 Child  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual has 
one child. (A) 
0.266 0.442 0.250 0.433 0.289 0.453 
2 Children  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual has 
two children. (A) 
0.137 0.344 0.136 0.343 0.139 0.346 
3 Children  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual has 
three children. (A) 
0.064 0.245 0.071 0.257 0.054 0.226 
4+ Children  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the individual has 
more than three children. (A) 
0.134 0.340 0.156 0.363 0.101 0.301 
Children Missing  Dummy for missing children information. (A)  0.064  0.245  0.070  0.255  0.056  0.229 
GDP per cap.  Real GDP per capita, scaled by 0.001. (B)  11.988  8.317  5.774 2.624  21.078  4.600 
Inflation  The Inflation rate in the country. (B)  0.004  0.123  -0.010  0.136  0.023  0.098 
Unemployment 
Rate 
The unemployment rate of the country. (C, D)  9.928  6.883  11.382  7.990  7.801  3.958 
CO2 Emission   Carbon dioxide emission per capita. (C)  0.593  0.415  0.714  0.483  0.417  0.175 
Low Corruption  Corruption index, ranges from 1 to 10, 10 being the 
least corrupt. (E) 
5.047 2.314 3.487 1.234 7.330 1.480 
Civil Rights  The degree of civil liberties, 1 to 7, 7 being the most 
free. (F) 
5.142 1.551 4.282 1.267 6.399 0.957 
Democracy Democracy-Autocracy  index, -10 to 10, -10 for full 
autocracy and 10 for full democracy. (G) 
6.457 5.125 4.487 5.329 9.339 3.029 
Birth Rate  Number of births per 1,000 women in country. (C)  16.782  7.788  19.903  8.485  12.217  2.998 
N   212948    126478    86470   
(A) World Values Survey, (B) Penn World Tables 6.2, (C) World Development Indictors, (D) International Labour Organization, (E) 
Transparency International, (F) Freedom House, (G) Polity IV. 23 
 
Table 2 
Ordered Probit Estimates of Satisfaction with Life 
Whole  Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female  0.03*** 0.02 0.06***  0.03*** 0.01 0.06***  0.03*** 0.01 0.06*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age -0.28***  -0.25***  -0.30***  -0.26***  -0.22*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.30*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Age
2  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.028*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Middle  Income  0.19*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Upper  Income  0.36*** 0.43*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 0.25*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Low–educated  -0.11***  -0.10***  -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.09***  -0.10*** -0.09** -0.08*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Part-time worker  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  0.00  0.03  -0.038*  0.01  0.02  -0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Self  Employed  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03 0.049* 0.02  0.04* 0.05*  0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Retired  -0.02  -0.07  0.01  -0.05**  -0.13*** 0.02  -0.05**  -0.13*** 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Housewife  0.04**  0.07** -0.02  0.05* 0.08**  -0.04* 0.05* 0.07**  -0.03* 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Student  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Unemployed -0.29***  -0.25***  -0.41***  -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.40*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.41*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 24 
 
Table 2 Continued
Whole  Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich 
Other  work  -0.06**  -0.02 -0.15 -0.04  0.03 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 -0.13 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Married  0.16***  0.11***  0.25  0.11*** 0.07***  0.24***  0.11*** 0.06** 0.24*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Cohabiting 0.03  -0.01  0.13***  0.14***  0.14**  0.17***  0.12**  0.14*  0.13*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) 
Divorced -0.09***  -0.11***  -0.08***  -0.14*** -0.21***  -0.07**  -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.08*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Separated -0.22***  -0.17***  -0.30***  -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.29*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.30*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Widowed -0.08***  -0.07***  -0.09***  -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
1  Child  -0.01*  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.020*  -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
2  Children  -0.01  -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
3 Children  0.02  0.02  0.04*  0.05***  0.05**  0.06**  0.05***  0.05**  0.04* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
4+ Children  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.08***  0.08***  0.07**  0.08***  0.08***  0.05 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per cap.  0.04***  0.07***  0.02**  0.02***  0.06***  0.01 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Democracy  0.01 0.01  0.21*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Civil Rights  0.01 -0.04  0.22*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 25 
 
Table 2 Concluded 
Whole  Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich Whole Poor  Rich 
Low Corruption  0.06*** 0.04 0.08*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Inflation  -0.31 -0.23 -0.20 -0.22 -0.17 0.05 
(0.25) (0.29) (0.52) (0.24) (0.28) (0.45) 
Unemployment Rate 
0.00 -0.01* 0.00  -0.01 -0.01* 0.01 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  0.00   0.00   (0.01) 
CO2 Emission  -0.21***  -0.14**  -0.12  -0.21***  -0.15***  -0.05 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) 
Birth  Rate  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Country  Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes No No No No No No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  212948  126478 86470 212948 126478 86470 212948  126478 86470 
Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” 
scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
sample used for the estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies. The first three columns also 
have country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. See Table 1 for the descriptions of the variables. 26 
 
Table 3 
Marginal Effects of the Country-level Variables for the Highest and the Lowest Categories 
Panel 1 
  Most Dissatisfied  Most Satisfied 
  Whole Poor  Rich Whole  Poor  Rich 
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Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your life as a whole these days?” scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample used for the 
estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies. The first 
three columns also have country fixed effects. Full set of control variables are included in 
estimations, but only the marginal effects of the country level variables are presented. Marginal 
effects are calculated at the means. Panel 1 and Panel 2 correspond to the regressions in columns 
4-6 and 7-9 of Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. See Table 1 for the 





Ordered Probit Estimates of Satisfaction with Life, Growth in last 20,25 and 30 years, 
Dependent Variable Satisfaction 
30 Year Lag  25 Year Lag  20 Year Lag 
Whole Poor  Rich  Whole  Poor Rich  Whole  Poor Rich 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDPt-30 0.05***  0.14***  0.00 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Growth30 4.36  15.34**  -11.03 
(4.33) (6.29) (8.12) 
GDPt-25 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.01 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Growth25 4.76  11.40** -3.75 
(3.48) (4.60) (7.57) 
GDPt-20 0.03***  0.09*** 0.01 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Growth20 4.22  9.09**  -1.79 
(2.77) (3.55) (5.08) 
Democracy  0.01  0.02  0.14**  0.01 0.02  0.17*** 0.01 0.02  0.18***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Civil  Rights  -0.03  -0.06  0.23*** -0.04  -0.06 0.20*** -0.03  -0.07 0.24***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Low  Corruption  0.02  -0.04  0.06*** 0.03  -0.04 0.07*** 0.03  -0.03 0.07***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Inflation  0.11  0.36  0.31 0.19 0.26 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.26 
(0.43) (0.50) (0.43)  (0.40)  (0.48) (0.48) (0.36) (0.45) (0.50) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.00  0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CO2  Emission  -0.05 -0.18  0.06 -0.07 -0.21 0.07 -0.10 -0.23 -0.08 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) 
Birth  Rate  0.01 0.02 0.00  0.02*  0.02  0.01  0.02**  0.01  0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations  150135  79263  70872 158037 83129  74908 164905 86584  78321 
Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your life as a whole these days?” scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample used for the 
estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies. Full set of 
explanatory variables are included in all regressions, but only the coefficients of country level 
variables are reported. The first three columns also have country fixed effects. Standard errors 






Panel 1: Most Dissatisfied 
  30 Year Lag  25 Year Lag  20 Year Lag 
  Whole  Poor Rich  Whole  Poor Rich  Whole  Poor  Rich 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GDPt-30  -0.28***  -1.37***  0.01           
  (0.10)  (0.45)  (0.05)           
Growth30  -26.33  -146.31***  27.17           
  (26.38)  (62.45)  (19.60)           
GDPt-25      -0.23***  -0.97***  -0.02       
        (0.07) (0.35) (0.04)       
Growth25      -28.66  -109.05***  9.18       
        (21.31) (46.01) (18.46)       
GDPt-20          -0.02***  -0.09***  0.00 
          (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
Growth20          -25.31  -86.69***  4.37 
          (16.74)  (34.74)  (12.36) 
Democracy  -0.06  -0.17 -0.34***  -0.08  -0.18 -0.42***  -0.06  -0.15  -0.44*** 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.15)  (0.07) (0.12) (0.15)  (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) 
Civil Rights  0.20  0.60  -0.58***  0.25 0.57  -0.50***  0.18 0.62  -0.57*** 
  (0.29) (0.51) (0.16)  (0.26) (0.47) (0.14)  (0.24) (0.43) (0.12) 
Low Corruption  -0.09  0.42  -0.15***  -0.15 0.34  -0.18***  -0.16 0.24  -0.17*** 









Table 5 Concluded 
Panel 2: Most Satisfied 
  30 Year Lag  25 Year Lag  20 Year Lag 
  Whole Poor Rich  Whole  Poor Rich  Whole  Poor Rich 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
GDPt-30  1.09***  3.42***  -0.07         
  (0.35)  (1.07)  (0.47)         
Growth30  102.42  363.88*** -258.18         
  (102.22)  (148.03)  (189.00)         
GDPt-25       0.88*** 2.39***  0.22     
       (0.25)  (0.84)  (0.37)      
Growth25       110.34  268.05***  -86.29     
       (81.52)  (108.71)  (173.66)    
GDPt-20           0.08*** 0.21***  0.02 
           (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
Growth20           96.94  212.32*** -40.66 
           (63.73)  (82.69)  (115.28) 
Democracy  0.23  0.41 3.21***  0.30  0.43 3.94***  0.22  0.36 4.06*** 
 (0.27)  (0.27)  (1.36)  (0.28)  (0.29) (1.41)  (0.27) (0.27) (1.20) 
Civil  Rights  -0.77  -1.48 5.48***  -0.95  -1.40 4.65***  -0.69  -1.51 5.34*** 
 (1.12)  (1.25)  (1.58)  (1.00)  (1.16) (1.34)  (0.93) (1.06) (1.12) 
Low  Corruption  0.36  -1.03 1.46***  0.58  -0.83 1.68***  0.60  -0.60 1.57*** 
 (0.54)  (0.85)  (0.57)  (0.52)  (0.85) (0.51)  (0.51) (0.82) (0.47) 
Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” 
scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
sample used for the estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies. The first three columns also 
have country fixed effects. Full set of control variables are included in estimation, but only the marginal effects of the country level 
variables that are in the paper’s interest are presented. The corresponding coefficients obtained from ordered probit regressions are 
presented in Table 4. Marginal effects are calculated at the means. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. See Table 1 for 
the descriptions of the independent variables.30 
 
Appendix Table 1 
OLS Estimates of Satisfaction with Life,  
Dependent Variable Satisfaction 
Whole Poor  Rich Whole  Poor  Rich 
GDP per cap.  0.08***  0.09**  0.06*** 0.05***  0.14***  0.01 
(0.01) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Democracy 0.02  0.02  0.39*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Civil Rights  -0.01  -0.09  0.396***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
Low Corruption  0.14***  0.09  0.16*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.03) 
Inflation  -0.96 -1.11  -0.89 -0.47  -0.39 -0.02 
(0.93) (1.06)  (1.04) (0.56) (0.68) (0.80) 
Unemployment  Rate -0.01 -0.02  0.01  -0.01 -0.017* 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CO2 Emission  -0.51***  -0.37**  -0.05 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.21) 
Birth Rate  0.06***  0.07***  0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 212948  126478  86470  212948  126478  86470 
Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your life as a whole these days?” scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample used for the 
estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies and 
individual level variables as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. See 












Appendix Table 2 
OLS Estimates of Satisfaction with Life, Growth in last 20, 25, 30 years 
Dependent Variable Satisfaction 
30 Year Lag  25 Year Lag  20 Year Lag 
Whole  Poor Rich  Whole  Poor Rich  Whole Poor Rich 
GDPt-30 0.11***  0.35***  -0.01 
(0.03) (0.11) (0.03) 
Growth30 10.58  37.029**  -19.60 
(9.94) (15.47)  (13.94) 
GDPt-25 0.09*** 0.24***  0.02 
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) 
Growth25 10.85  27.059** -6.46 
(7.97) (11.30)  (12.78) 
GDPt-20 0.078***  0.220*** 0.02 
(0.02) (0.07)  (0.02) 
Growth20 10.372*  22.264** -2.81 
(6.21) (8.69)  (8.29) 
Democracy  0.03  0.05 0.258** 0.03  0.05 0.32*** 0.03  0.04 0.34***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.09) 
Civil  Rights  -0.09  -0.17 0.43*** -0.10  -0.16 0.36*** -0.08  -0.17 0.42***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.11)  (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.12) (0.08) 
Low  Corruption 0.04  -0.11 0.12*** 0.06  -0.09 0.14*** 0.06  -0.07 0.14***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.04) 
Inflation  0.38 1.05 0.47  0.54 0.78 0.52 0.08  0.18 0.35 
(1.01) (1.29) (0.78)  (0.93) (1.24) (0.87) (0.84)  (1.14) (0.90) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.00 0.02 -0.01  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01  0.02 0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) 
CO2  Emission -0.16 -0.47 0.11 -0.19 -0.52 0.14 -0.27  -0.57 -0.12 
(0.39) (0.47) (0.22)  (0.36) (0.42) (0.21) (0.33)  (0.40) (0.23) 
Birth  Rate  0.02 0.04 0.00  0.030*  0.04 0.01  0.030*  0.03 0.03 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Observations  150135  79263 70872  158037  83129 74908  164905 86584 78321 
Dependent variable is the answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your life as a whole these days?” scaled between 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample used for the 
estimation is listed at the top of each column. All regressions include year dummies and 
individual level variables as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. See 
Table 1 for the descriptions of the independent variables. 
 
 